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MAKING THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE IN
REASONABLE OBSERVER CASES MORE
REASONABLE
Tension between religious freedom and government policy is
not a recent development in the United States, nor is it unique to
the twentieth century.' The Framers of the United States Constitution drafted within the First Amendment the complementary
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses 2 in an attempt to minimize this tension and secure individual religious liberty.3 While
other clauses address relations between church and state, 4 the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses have fueled the most debate. 5 Arguably, these two clauses, collectively known as "the reli-

1 See Robert L. Cord & Howard Ball, The Separationof Church and State: A Debate, 1987 UTAH L. REv. 895, 911-17 (1987). The disestablishment of churches in the
states came after much highly charged political debate. Id. at 911-14. Not until 1833,
when Massachusetts disestablished its state church, did the states' "constitutionally
or statutorily mandated establishment of religion end[ I in America." Id. at 911.
2 U.S. CoNsT. amend. I. The First Amendment provides, in pertinent part, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof. . . ." Id.
3 See 3 JOSEPH STORY, COSItENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 728 (De Capo Press ed., 1970) (stating object of amendment was to eliminate
means of religious persecution); Rodney K. Smith, Nonpreferentialism in Establishment ClauseAnalysis: A Response to ProfessorLaycock, 65 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 245,
245 (1991) (asserting intent of two clauses as whole was to protect religious freedom);
see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 14-3, at 1158-60 (2d
ed. 1988) (discussing three schools of thought influenced drafters: desire to protect
church from state; desire to protect state from church; and desire to protect each from
other). See generally MICHAEL J. MALBIN, RELIGION AND POLITICs: THE INTENTIONS OF
THE AUTHORS OF THE FIRST AaNmmNT (1978) (analyzing of debates in first Congress
as evidence of intent of framers).
4 See, e.g., U.S. CONsT. art. VI. This Article provides that "no religious Test shall
ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United
States." Id.
5 See James E. Wood, Jr., Introduction to THE FIRST FREEDOM: RELIGION & THE
BILL OF RIGHTS 1, 3 (James E. Wood, Jr. ed., 1980); Philip B. Kurland, The Origins of
the Religion Clauses of the Constitution,27 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 839 (1986). "In 1789,
then, when Madison was called on to draft the religious freedom provisions of the first
amendment... the most troublesome problem of establishment, the test oath, already
had been taken care of by article VI of the Constitution." Id. at 853.
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gion clauses,"6 have provided "as complex a connection as exists in
Constitutional law."7
The debate concerning the Establishment Clause initially
erupted after Everson v. Board of Education,8 in which the
Supreme Court upheld a New Jersey statute providing reimbursement to parents for their children's transportation expenses to
nonpublic schools. 9 Since Everson, there have been numerous
cases,' ° which have frequently divided courts" and generated an
6 See Note, Developments in the Law-Religion and the State, 100 HARv. L. REV.
1606, 1609 (1987).
7 Alan E. Brownstein, Harmonizing the Heavenly and Earthly Spheres: The
Fragmentationand Synthesis of Religion, Equality, and Speech in the Constitution,51
OHIO ST. L.J. 89 (1990). Brownstein attributes the difficulty in defining the relationship, in part, to the dual commands of the First Amendment, and in part, to the central role which religion often takes in both societal and individual experiences. Id.; see
TRIBE, supra note 3, § 14-2, at 1155-57 (noting that serious tension has arisen between two clauses); JOHN E. NowAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONsITUTIoNAL LAW
1157 (4th ed. 1991) ("There is a natural antagonism between a command not to establish religion and a command not to inhibit its practice.").
8 330 U.S. 1 (1947). See James M. Lewis & Michael L. Vild, Note, A Controversial
Twist of Lemon: The Endorsement Test as the New Establishment Clause Standard,
65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 671, 688 (1990) (noting that Establishment Clause has been
widely scrutinized since 1947). Many scholars consider Everson to be the first case of
recent import to extensively analyze the meaning of the Establishment Clause. ROBERT L. CORD,SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND CURRENT FicTION xiii (1982). Before Everson, only two major Supreme Court cases involved interpretation of the clause. Id. at 103. One was Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899),
in which the Court upheld federal monetary assistance to a Catholic Church-operated
hospital for building construction and for the care of indigent patients. Id. In the second case, Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50, 65 (1908), the Court again upheld the
federal appropriation of money used for the Catholic school tuition of Sioux Indians.
Id. at 104.
9 Fuerson, 330 U.S. at 1. A portion of the allocated funds were used to reimburse parents whose children attended Catholic schools. Id. In holding that the statute did not violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, the Court nevertheless adopted a separationist's view concerning church and state relations. Id. at
18. The Court stated that [tlhe First Amendment has erected a wall between church
and state. That wall must be kept high and impregnable. We could not approve the
slightest breach." Id.
10 See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990) (ruling that equal
access policy allowing religious clubs in public schools did not violate Establishment
Clause); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756
(1973) (holding tuition reimbursement program for parents of children attending nonpublic schools unconstitutional); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203
(1963) (declaring Bible reading in classrooms unconstitutional); Zorach v. Clauson,
343 U.S. 306 (1952) (finding New York law which permitted absence from school for
religious instruction constitutionally valid).
11 See Lewis & Vild, supra note 8, at 687-88 (observing that two recent Supreme
Court cases involving Establishment Clause, Texas Monthly, Inc. v.Bullock, 489 U.S.
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enormous amount of scholarly literature.1 2 Ultimately, most Establishment Clause cases can be reduced to one fundamental issue-whether the First Amendment requires an impregnable
"wall of separation between church and State,"1 3 or if it allows for
some interaction or accommodation between the two.' 4
Although this debate continues today, this Note adheres primarily to the principles underlying the accommodation view,
without engaging in the heavy burden of discussing the validity or
accuracy of either theory. Such an analysis has already been undertaken by many Supreme Court Justices 5 and constitutional
scholars.' 6 Instead, this Note compares three recent circuit court

decisions and their application of current Supreme Court Establishment Clause jurisprudence: Americans United for Separation
of Church and State v. City of GrandRapids,1 7 Kreisner v. City of
San Diego,'8 and Chabad-Lubavitch of Georgia v. Miller.'9
1 (1989), and County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573
(1989), alone generated nine opinions).
12 See Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understandingof Free
Exercise of Religion, 103 HARv. L. REV. 1410, 1413-14 (1990) ("[Slcores of law review
articles and a number of scholarly books have been devoted to the historical back").
ground of the establishment clause ...
13 16 THE WarsriNS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 281 (1905). Jefferson first penned this
now famous phrase concerning the religious clauses in his letter to the Danbury Connecticut Baptist Associaton in 1802. Compare CORD, supra note 8, at 114-16 (providing full passage and accommodationist explanation of Jefferson's views) with LEO
PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE AND FREEDOM 133-35 (1967) (separationist's view of letter).
14 Raymond W. Mitchell, Comment, A Small Departurefrom the Truth: When
PrivateReligious Speech Runs Afoul of the Establishment Clause, 23 Loy. U. Cm. L.J.
867, 869 (1992) ("This debate has generally broken down into two opposing factions:
separationists and accommodationists.").
15 See, e.g., Everson, 330 U.S. at 13-16, 33-43. The "wall of separation" theory was
most lucidly espoused in both Justice Black's majority opinion in Everson, id. at 1316, and later in Justice Rutledge's dissent, id. at 33-43. By contrast, in a dissenting
opinion in Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91-107 (1985), Justice Rehnquist proposed
the opposite view of accommodation, requiring less separation between the two
spheres. Id.
16 See, e.g., STORY, supra note 3, at 722. Joseph Story, who served as a Supreme
Court Justice from 1845 to 1881, and as a professor at Harvard Law School from 1829
to 1881, is among the foremost scholars who supported the accommodationist view.
Id. In addition, twentieth century legal scholars Edwin Corwin and Professor Robert
L. Cord have also endorsed this view. See CORD, supra note 8, at 17. But see PFEFFER,
supra note 13, at 149-50. Pfeffer champions the view that the purpose of the Clause
was to "erect a wall of separation between the church and State." Id. See generally
LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTRLmsHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
(1986) (supporting separationist view).
17 980 F.2d 1538 (6th Cir. 1992) (en banc).
18 988 F.2d 883 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 690 (1994).
19 976 F.2d 1386 (11th Cir. 1992).
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Although the courts were correct in applying the test articulated
by the Supreme Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman,20 each applied the
test differently, resulting in seemingly incompatible holdings. 2 '
Part I of this Note includes a brief description, including historical justification, of the two primary interpretations of the Establishment Clause: separation and accommodation. Part II reviews the current Supreme Court jurisprudence as well as the
modern approach to Establishment Clause cases. Part III examines the Chabad-Lubavitch, Kreisner, and Grand Rapids decisions, discussing and comparing the courts' analyses. Finally,
Part IV proposes a novel definition of the "reasonable observer"
standard, borrowing language from the Kreisner opinion, that
would be both consistent with the purpose of the Establishment
Clause and would promote greater uniformity for future decisions.
I.

INTERPRETATION OF THE ESTABLISiMENT CLAUSE

Debate over the appropriate interpretation of the Establishment Clause is generally led by two opposing factions: separationists and accommodationists. 22 Separationists assert that the intention of the religion clauses is to keep "the states' hands out of
religion... [and] religion's hands off the state";23 they argue that
a strict "wall of separation between church and state"24 isnecessary. Separationists believe that within this type of framework
20 403 U.S. 602 (1971). For a definition and analysis of the test formulated in this
case, see infra notes 46-68 and accompanying text.
21 Compare Grand Rapids, 980 F.2d at 1539 (holding menorah temporarily erected on plaza used as public forum not constitutional violation) and Kreisner, 988
F.2d at 885 (finding Christmas display in city park not violative of Establishment
Clause) with Chabad-Lubavitch,976 F.2d at 1387 (holding privately-owned menorah
in state capitol building, previously used for other types of displays, unconstitutional).
22 See Mitchell, supra note 14, at 869.
23 Everson, 330 U.S. at 26-27 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
24 Everson, 330 U.S. at 15-16. In this case, the Court first espoused the "wall of
separation" theory:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means at
least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church.
Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one
religion over another. Neither can force ... a person to go to or to remain
away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief
in any religion. No person can be punished for.., professing religious beliefs
or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax ... can be
levied to support any religious activities ....Neither a state nor the Federal
Government can ...participate in the affairs of any religious organizations
...and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause ...was intended to
erect "a wall of separation between Church and State."
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the freedom of religion and freedom of conscience, which are "too
precious to be either proscribed or prescribed by the State,"25 can
best be protected from the intrusion of government. 26 Furthermore, proponents of this view suggest that the desire to protect
the state from religious
interference militates against any interac27
tion between the two.

By contrast, accommodationists argue that faithful interpretation28 of the Establishment Clause recognizes the legitimacy of
a relationship between religion and government.2 9 They contend
that the Framers merely sought to prevent the establishment of
an official church or religion.30 Moreover, scholars of this apId. See generally SAUL K. PADOVER, THE CoMpLEs JEFFERSON 518-19 (1943) (reprinting now famous letter Jefferson sent to Danbury Connecticut Baptist Association
on January 1, 1802, wherein he first penned metaphor).
25 Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2656 (1992). In holding that the benediction
given by a clergyman at a high school graduation violated the Establishment Clause,
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, embraced a separationist's viewpoint. Id.
at 2661. This opinion is in sharp contrast to Kennedy's strongly pro-accommodation
dissent just three years earlier in County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh
Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 655 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
26 See TRIBE, supra note 3, § 14-3, at 816. In analyzing historical views toward
government and religion, Tribe notes Roger Williams' fear that "worldy corruption
...might consume the churches if sturdy fences against the wilderness are not maintained." Id. (quoting MARK D. HowE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNEss 6 (1965)); cf.
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 432 (1962) (striking down nondenominational prayer
mandated in New York schools, and reasoning that "religion is too personal, too sacred, too holy, to permit its 'unhallowed perversion' by a civil magistrate" (citation
omitted)).
27 Everson, 330 U.S. at 27 (stating that society benefits when separated from "bitter religious controversy" and safeguarded from any religion "getting control of public
policy or the public purse").
28 See William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution,54 TEX L. Rv.
693, 696-97 (1976). Chief Justice Rehnquist now argues that the judiciary, as appointed and not elected officials, must faithfully apply the Constitution as the Framers intended, and allow the other branches of government to make changes in the
Constitution to meet the needs of society and to reflect new values. Id.
29 See STORY, supra note 3, § 1865, at 722. "Indeed, the right of a society or government to interfere in matters of religion will hardly be contested by any persons
who believe that piety, religion, and morality are intimately connected with the well
being of the state, and indispensable to the administration of civil justice." Id.; see
also Yehudah Mirsky, Civil Religion and the Establishment Clause, 95 YALE L.J.
1237, 1255 (1986) (focusing on traditional and cultural aspects of "civil religion," author argues that courts can find legitimate roles for religion in society without crossing Establishment Clause); Michael W. McConnell, Coercion: The Lost Element of
Establishment, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 933, 940 (1986) (remarking that absent governmental coercion towards one religion, state has "legitimate pursuits" which often
"incidentally assist[ I the various religions").
30 Wallace v. JafTree, 472 U.S. 38, 99 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). This dissent reflects a traditional accommodationist view that the Establishment Clause was
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proach have sharply criticized separationism as "a pretext for governmental censorship of religious speech""' and "active hostility to
the religious."3 2
Even within these two schools, however, there is some disagreement as to the precise limits of desirable accommodation or
separation. Scholarly literature reflects viewpoints ranging from
absolute separation to affirmative government encouragement of
religion.3 3 There seems to be little consensus on the exact constitutional threshhold.
Interestingly, proponents in the opposing camps both support
their positions by citing the Framers' original intent3 4 and by noting the history surrounding the adoption of the Establishment
written to prohibit only "the establishment of a national church." Id.; see CoRD, supra
note 8, at 15. In a similar vein, Cord argues that the Clause protects "against invasion
solely by the national government... allow[ing] the states, unimpeded, to deal with
religious establishments as they [see] fit." Id.
31 Mitchell, supra note 14, at 883 (noting Justice Brennan's warning of future
repression of religion under guise of Establishment Clause jurisprudence in McDaniel
v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 642 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
32 Wallace, 472 U.S. at 86 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (observing that commitment
to secular or neutral state can lead to "'active hostility to the religious'" (quoting
Judge Goldberg concurring in Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 206
(1963)); see Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 248 (1990) ("[I]f a State refused
to let religious groups use facilities open to others, then it would demonstrate not
neutrality but hostility toward religion.").
An example of judicial hostility to religion can be found in Justice Douglas's concurring opinion in Lemon, 403 U.S. at 602 n.20. "The whole [Catholic school] education.., is filled with propaganda .... Their purpose is not so much to educate, but to
indoctrinate and train, not to teach Scripture truths and Americanism, but to make
loyal Roman Catholics." Id. (citation omitted).
33 Compare Cord & Ball, supra note 1, at 915 (calling for formal or strict separation in order to protect individual religious liberty) with Bruce Fein, On Reading the
Constitution, 90 MICH. L. REv. 1225, 1235 (1992) (suggesting religion clauses permit
government to favor religion over nonreligion).
34 See County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573,
589-90 (1989) (positing that "[pirecisely because of the religious diversity," Founders
wrote First Amendment to protect individual consciences regarding religion); Kurland, supra note 5, at 836-57. Responding to the religious intolerance experienced in
parts of New England, other colonies gradually grew more accepting of minority denominations of Christianity. Id. This separationist sentiment "culminated in the right
to religious freedom embodied in the first amendment." Id.
In his dissent in Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992), in which the Court
invalidated a clergy benediction, Justice Scalia argued that original intent encompassed much accommodation of religion and warned that the Constitution "cannot
possibly rest upon the changeable philosophical predilections of the Justices of this
Court, but must have deep foundations in the historic practices of our people." Id. at
2685 (Scalia, J., dissenting); CoRD, supra note 8, at 5 (stating that "words and actions
of the initial framers" do not support separationist theory, but rather original intent
to prohibit establishment of state church).
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Clause.3 5 Scholars from both sides also acknowledge certain incongruities in the evidence; for example, while both theorists
claim that Madison3 6 and Jefferson3 7 supported their view,
neither side can fully explain the apparent inconsistencies between the statesmen's political writings and their public lives.3
In further support of their view, accommodationists point to
such evidence as the wording of the Clause, 39 as well as the long
history of church-state relations in this nation.4 0 Separationists,
however, insist that both the "current fundamental operating

35 Compare Kurland, supra note 5, at 845-46 (arguing that Constitution written
in response to issues such as Established Church, which many colonists had experienced in many new colonies as well as in England) with STORY, supra note 3, § 1868
at 726. At the time of the adoption of the First Amendment, "the general, if not the
universal, sentiment in America was, that Christianity ought to receive encouragement from the state." Id.
36 Compare TRIBE, supra note 3, § 4-3, at 1159 (asserting that Madison advocated
separation of spheres to protect public from "a corrupt[ I coalition" of government and
religion and to protect religion from unwarranted trespass) with DONALD L.
DRiAumAN, CHURCH-STATE CONSTITTIONAL ISSUES 52 (1991) (noting that Madison,
contrary to being separationist, adopted resolution in favor of day of prayer and
thanksgiving immediately after ratifying Establishment Clause).
37 See Wood, supra note 5, at 105. In addition to Jefferson's letter to the Danbury
Baptists, support for the view that he was a strict separationist can be gleaned from
his participation in the enactment of the "Act for Establishing Religious Freedom" in
Virginia. Id. at 10. This act became the model statute for other states wanting to
change the close relationship between church and state. Id. But see CORD, supra note
8, at 115-16. Arguing that Jefferson could not have been a separationist, Cord notes
the treaty Jefferson made with the Kaskaskia Indians just one year after his Danbury
letter. Id. The treaty specifically provided for financial support to build a Catholic
church and to pay for a priest. Id.
38 See CORD, supra note 8, at 17-47.
39 See CORD, supra note 8, at 11-12. Accommodationists contend that had the
Framers intended to prohibit all government involvement with religion, they would
have used the words "the establishment" rather than "an establishment." Id. (quoting
MICHAEL T. MALBIN, RELIGION AND POITICs: THE INTENTIONS OF THE AUTHORS OF THE
FIRST AMENDMiENT 14-15 (1978)). This wording could only mean that a prohibition
against government preference of one religion over another, not actions which deal
with religions nonpreferentially, was at the heart of the Clause. Id.
40 See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2678-81 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing traditions of prayers at public ceremonies, presidential oaths sworn on
Bible, and Supreme Court opening invocation calling for providential guidance);
County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 657 (1989)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("Any approach less sensitive to our heritage [than government accommodation] would border on latent hostility toward religion."); Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 674 (1984) (noting that in same week that Bill of Rights was
submitted to states for ratification, Congress passed legislation providing for paid
chaplains for both houses).
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principles of... society" 4 1 and much of the recent case law support

their position.42 Obviously, this debate is far from over.
II.

CuRRENT ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE

Although current Establishment Clause jurisprudence can be
traced back to Everson v. Board of Education,43 the Court did not
formalize a consolidated approval to the Establishment Clause
cases until 1971 in Lemon v. Kurtzman.44 In holding unconstitutional two state statutes which provided for monetary assistance
to nonpublic schools, 45 the Lemon Court summarized the "cumulative criteria developed by the Court over many years" 46 in order
for a state action to withstand a challenge under the Establishment Clause: (1) the statute must have a secular purpose, (2) its
primary effect must neither advance nor inhibit religion, and (3) it
must not create excessive entanglement between government and
religion.47
41 John F. Wilson, OriginalIntent and the Quest for Comparable Consensus, in
THE FIRST FREEDOM: RELIGION & THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 5, at 113, 129. The

Clauses, if they are to have meaning today, must reflect changes in society since the
time of the drafting. Id. Thus, the political culture today is a valid basis for the "ideal
of religion as independent of government." Id. at 131.
42 See Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2649 (prohibiting "non-sectarian" prayers by clergy at
school graduation); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 219 (1963) (striking down statute requiring Bible reading in public schools); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S.
421, 431 (1962) (holding nondenominational prayer in public schools unconstitutional). But see Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (upholding Nebraska Legislature's practice of opening sessions with prayer); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 668 (upholding
municipal policy of creche display at Christmas).
43 330 U.S. 1 (1947). Since this decision, there has been much debate concerning
the development of contemporary Supreme Court doctrine in the area. See Note,
supra note 6, at 1609.
44 403 U.S. 602 (1971); see Note, supra note 6, at 1644. Since 1971, "establishment clause analysis has been governed by the tripartite test in Lemon v. Kurtzman."
Id.
45 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 606-07. The Court struck down a Rhode Island statute
which provided additional salary support to teachers of secular subjects in private
schools whose "average per-student expenditure on secular education" was below that
of the public school. Id. In practice, the only teachers to apply for the benefits were
employed in Catholic schools. Id. at 608. The Court also struck down a Pennsylvania
statute which provided for the reimbursement of "secular educational services in
nonpublic schools, including teachers' salaries and textbooks used for secular subjects. Id. at 609.
46 Id. at 612.
47 Id. at 612-13. This test would effectively safeguard against "three main [Establishment Clause] evils... 'sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of
the sovereign in religious activity.'" Id. at 612 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S.
664, 668 (1970)).
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The test has been the subject of much criticism since the
Supreme Court enunciated in it Lemon.4" Foremost among the
censure is the allegation that the test "has no... grounding in the
history of the First Amendment," but rather is a creation of later
judicial musing.4" The test has also been criticized for its lack of
uniform application over the past twenty-two years.50 Despite its
continued use of Lemon, the Court has never confined itself to
Lemon as the rigid rule of universal application in Establishment
Clause cases. 5 1 Finally, both accommodationists and separationists criticize the apparent inconsistencies in decisions that apply
52

the test.

Nevertheless, the Lemon standard remains the primary test
for the Establishment Clause cases. 3 Within the last decade, it
48 See Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2685 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that Lemon test deserves criticism it has generated from members of Court);
County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 655 (1989)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("I am content for present purposes to remain within the
Lemon framework, but do not wish to be seen as advocating [it] .... Persuasive criticism of Lemon has emerged."); see also Gene R. Nichol, Religion and the State, 27 WM.
& MARY L. Rav. 833, 835 (1986) (observing that Lemon test is "on a collision course
with itself'); Note, supra note 6, at 1644 (stating test provokes much criticism and
dissatisfaction from both sides of debate, in both academia and judiciary).
49 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 110 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 639 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe first prong
of Lemon is defensible, I think, only if the text of the Establishment Clause demands
it. That is surely not the case.").
50 See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 68 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that application
of test has proven problematic and that in Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983),
Court failed to apply test at all); Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2685 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[T]he
interment of [Lemon] may be the one happy byproduct of the Court's otherwise lamentable decision.").
51 See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679 (1984) (noting Court's repeated unwillingness "to be confined to any single test or criterion"); County of Allegheny, 492
U.S. at 656 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (terming Lemon "helpful signpost" or "guideline"
rather than "comprehensive test"); see also William P. Marshall, "We Know It When
We See Ift": The Supreme Court and Establishment,59 S. CAL. L. REv. 495, 496 (1986)
(stating that role of Lemon test has been unclear). Attitudes of the Court towards the
test have ranged from unnecessary, to helpful as a guideline, to essential in analysis.
Id. at 497.
52 See Nichol, supra note 48, at 834. Nichol comments on seemingly arbitrary outcomes of cases including, interalia, the aflirmance of state aid for a blind man's study
for the ministry in Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 106 S. Ct. 748
(1986), and the invalidation of a school system's moment of silence for meditation or
voluntary prayer in Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985). Id.; see Scott Titshaw,
Note, Sharpeningthe Prongsof the EstablishmentClause: Applying StricterScrutiny
to Majority Religions, 23 GA. L. Rav. 1085, 1112 (1989) (noting that even with finetuning of test, opponents still claim "bizarre results" are produced).
53 See, e.g., Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2655 (refusing to reconsider constitutional framework provided in Lemon); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 678 (applying test yet refusing to bind
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has been subjected to some revision, however, primarily at the
hands of Justice O'Connor. 54 The first modification appeared in
1984 in Lynch v. Donnelly.5 The Lynch Court held municipal
ownership and display of a creche in a privately owned park to be
constitutional. 56 In a concurring opinion, O'Connor suggested a
clarification of the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence.57
Focusing on the second prong of the Lemon test, that the statute's
primary effect neither advance nor inhibit religion, O'Connor proposed that the Court reframe the issue to question whether the
state action constituted endorsement or disapproval of religion.58
Specifically, she stated that government actions should be found
as endorsements if they had the effect of making "religion relevant, in reality or public perception, to [a person's] status in the
political community."5 9
Justice O'Connor, again in a concurrence, built on the "endorsement" test in Wallace v. Jaffree.60 The Court, in applying
Lemon, struck down an Alabama statute which had instituted, in
public schools, a period of silence to be used "for meditation or voluntary prayer."61 The crucial twist O'Connor added to the test
was the application of an "objective observer" test to measure the
effects produced by a state action. 62 O'Connor suggested questioning "whether an objective observer acquainted with the text, legisfuture courts to its use); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 271 (1981) (holding that
student use of state university classrooms for religious groups constitutional under
Lemon).
54 See, e.g., Lynch, 465 U.S. at 668; Wallace, 472 U.S. at 38; see also Note, supra
note 6, at 1647-48 (observing O'Connor's reformulation of Lemon as better to "achieve
the establishment's core purpose of prohibiting government 'from making adherence
to a religion relevant in any way to a person's standing in the political community'"
(quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687) (O'Connor, J., concurring))); infra notes 55-63 and
accompanying text (detailing O'Connor's suggested revisions). See generally Richard
A. Cordray & James T. Vradelis, Comment, The Emerging Jurisprudence of Justice
O'Connor, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 389, 448-55 (1985) (providing overview of O'Connor's
work on Court-particularly principle of liberal neutrality used in religion clause
cases).
55 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
56 Id. at 687 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
57 Id.
58 Id. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
59 Id. at 692 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
60 472 U.S. 38, 68-74 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
61 Id. at 40. Another Alabama statute which called for a moment of silence "for
meditation" alone was previously found constitutional by the district court, and this
holding was not questioned in the appeal before the Supreme Court. Id. at 41.
62 Id. at 76 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

1993]

ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE

949

the statute, would perceive it
lative history and implementation of
63
as a state endorsement of prayer."
In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court adopted O'Connor's
guidelines concerning both endorsement and the objective observer, 6 4 which until then had only been found in concurring
opinions. Nevertheless, three recent circuit court cases involving
religious holiday displays illustrate the need for further clarifica65
tion of the test.
III.

CIRCUIT COURTS' TREATMENT OF RELIGIOUS DIsPLAYs

One area of particular contention within the Establishment
Clause debate has been the issue of government involvement with
religious displays at holidays.66 The Supreme Court has visited
this question at least two times in the past ten years alone. 67 Despite the Court's recent attention, however, the circuits continue

to use conflicting standards of a "reasonable observer" to determine violations of the Establishment Clause.68
A.

The Eleventh Circuit

In Chabad-Lubavitch of Georgia v. Miller, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower court's holding that the display of a fifteen63 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
64 See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S.
573, 593-594 (1989); Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 249-50 (1990).
65 See Chabad-Lubavitch,976 F.2d at 1395 (defining objective observer as unaware of forum's previous activity); Kreisner,988 F.2d at 892 (noting that "hypothetical
observer.. . is familiar with history of the government practice at issue"); Grand
Rapids, 980 F.2d at 1549 (holding that "reasonable observer knows that other speakers have used the Plaza before, and will do so again"); see also Donald L. Beschle, The
Conservative as Liberal: The Religion Clauses, Liberal Neutrality, and the Approach
of Justice O'Connor, 62 NoTRE DIAm L. REv. 151, 175 (1987) ("Since this concept of
the absence of government endorsement has only been put forward in a handful of
separate opinions by Justice O'Connor," the theory is still "largely undeveloped."); infra notes 112-16 and accompanying text (illustrating problems with current jurisprudence and need for uniform application among courts).
66 See infranote 67 (listing recent Supreme Court cases involving such displays).
67 See, e.g., Lynch, 465 U.S. at 668 (creche owned and displayed by city in private
park found constitutional); County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 621 (ruling on two holiday displays, with different results). In County of Allegheny, a creche donated to the
county courthouse was placed on the courthouse's Grand Staircase, unaccompanied
by other holiday displays. Id. at 579-81. The second display, a privately owned 18-foot
menorah, was placed next to a 45-foot Christmas tree at the entrance to the CityCounty Building. Id. at 587. The Court, for various reasons, found the creche, but not
the menorah and tree to be an unconstitutional display. Id. at 621.
68 See infra notes 69-113 and accompanying text (detailing analysis and various
standards used to determine same issue in each circuit).
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foot menorah in the rotunda of the state capitol violated the Establishment Clause.69 Chabad-Lubavitch, a Hasidic Jewish organization, 70 owned and maintained the menorah erected in the
display. 71 In the previous year, Chabad had been granted permission to place the menorah on the plaza in front of the capitol. 72
Chabad had posted a sign stating "HAPPY CHANUKAH from
CHABAD OF GEORGIA" next to the display, and on each night of
Chanukah conducted a lighting ceremony.73 Due to a policy
change enacted by the building authority and upheld by the
court,74 Chabad was forced to move the menorah inside the state
capitol building the following year.75 Although the rotunda had
been used by numerous groups in the past as a forum for different
displays and press conferences, 76 Chabad-Lubavitch was denied
permission by the state Attorney General who believed the display
to be "an impermissible appearance of state sponsorship."77 Both
the district court and the Eleventh Circuit agreed with this
finding.78
The court, finding the rotunda to be a limited public forum,79
stated that only a compelling state interest could sustain the
Chabad-Lubavitch,976 F.2d at 1395.
Id. at 1387. Chabad-Lubavitch is an organization "dedicated to reawakening
and educating other Jews and the public on the Jewish faith." Id.
71 Id. at 1387-88.
72 Id. at 1387.
73 Id.
74 Chabad-Lubavitch,976 F.2d at 1388-89. Content-neutral policies, prohibiting
speech based on "reasonable time, place and manner" restrictions are constitutional.
Id. at 1388. The policy enacted by the Georgia Building and Grounds Authority prohibited the unattended display on the grounds, but left the Rotunda of the State Capitol available for such displays. Id.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 1390. Over the preceding nine years, the state had never denied access to
any group, allowing the display of an eighteen-foot Indian teepee, a Holocaust
Commemoration, and press conferences of different political action groups. Id.
"[H]istorical, educational and cultural events, and many others have been permitted
by the State in conformity with a content-neutral, equal access policy and. . . the
State has allowed access to the Rotunda on a first-come, first-serve basis to all interested parties." Id.
77 Id. at 1388.
78 Id. at 1387.
79 Chabad-Lubavitch,976 F.2d at 1395. Based on the nature of the property at
the heart of government, and the state's open policy concerning its use as a forum for
free expression, the court concluded that the rotunda was not a traditional public
forum, but rather a limited one. Id.
69
70
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state's decision to deny access to Chabad.80 The desire to avoid a
violation of the Establishment Clause was found to be a sufficiently compelling interest. 81 Applying the Lemon test, the court
found that, based on the context of the message, 2 the menorah
would be an impermissible endorsement by the state.8 3 The court
stated that although the rotunda had often been used for "a broad
spectrum of protected speech," 4 an observer "would be unaware of
that previous activity" and would not view it "in the context of the
State's longstanding practice."8 5 Thus, the audience, many of
whom would be out-of-town visitors to the capitol, would be uninformed of prior uses of the rotunda and would therefore conclude
that the State supported the religious message contained in the
menorah display. 6
B. The Ninth and Sixth Circuits
In Kreisner, the Ninth Circuit was confronted with a similar
issue of whether an eight-scene Christmas display erected in San
Diego's Balboa Park violated the First Amendment's prohibition
against an establishment of religion. 7 The circuit court upheld
the district court's holding that the display did not violate the Establishment Clause88 and held that the display could remain as
long as its sponsors did not receive preferential treatment from
the city.8 9
Balboa Park was owned by the City of San Diego and housed
theaters, museums, picnic areas, sports fields, and a zoo. 90 Prior
80 Id. at 1391. "Once property has been designated as a limited public forum by
opening it generally to the public, content-based distinction is permissible only if narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest." Id. (citing Widmar v. Vincent, 454
U.S. 263, 270 (1981)).
81 Id. "The Supreme Court has held that the need to avoid an establishment
clause violation does represent a compelling state interest, but only if the proposed
speech actually violates the clause." Id. (emphasis added) (citing Widmar, 454 U.S at
271).
82 Id. at 1393. The court analogized the menorah display in the rotunda to the
creche display on the Grand Staircase in County ofAllegheny as both were unaccompanied religious symbols located at the heart of government operations. Id.
83 Id. at 1395.
84 Chabad-Lubavitch,976 F.2d at 1394.
85 Id. at 1395.
86

Id.

87

Kreisner, 988 F.2d at 885.
Id. at 883.

88

89 Id. at 885.

9o Id.
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to the Kreisner matter, the city had allowed a private, nonprofit
organization, the Community Christmas Center Committee, to
sponsor secular as well as religious holiday displays. 91 The religious display at issue consisted of life-sized scenes depicting the
life of Christ, often accompanied by biblical references. 9 2 In prior
years, the city had erected, removed, and stored the displays on its
property.9 3 However, in 1988 this policy changed, 4 and the Committee took over maintenance and began reimbursing the city for
95
electrical costs.

The court began its analysis of the First Amendment issues
by tracing the principles established by the Supreme Court in
Lemon v. Kurtzman, County of Allegheny v. ACLU GreaterPittsburgh Chapter, and Lee v. Weisman.9" Although the court recognized the flaws of the Lemon standard, 97 it dutifully adhered to
the test, applying the most recent additions to the reasonable observer standard. 9s In finding no endorsement by the City of San
Diego, the court employed the following standard of the reasonable observer:
[He] is informed as well as reasonable; we assume that he or she
is familiar with the history of the government practice at issue,
as well as with the general contours of the Free Speech Clause
and public forum doctrine... [He] is aware of Balboa Park's pub-

lic forum nature and the city's first-come, first-served permit pol91 Id. The constitutionality of the secular display, which included a Santa Claus,
reindeer, and a Christmas tree, was not in question in this case. Id.
92 Kreisner, 988 F.2d at 886.
93 Id. at 907 (Boochever, C.J., dissenting).
94 Id. at 886. In 1988, the City Attorney issued an opinion stating such involvement in the religious display by the city was a violation of the Establishment Clause.
Id. As a result, the policy changed. Id.
95 Id. The city granted other privileges to the Committee, which the court deemed
permissible. Id. For example, pursuant to its policy to waive user fees for "non-profit
community service organizations," the city did not charge the Committee for the
space. Id. The court considered the waiver valid, as the fee was only charged to those
organizations that had exclusive use of the area in question, which the Christmas
Committee did not. Id. at 897. In addition, the city allowed the Committee to set
up donation barrels at the site despite its nonsolicitation ordinance. Id. at 909
(Boochever, C.J., dissenting). The court refused to rule on this issue as it questioned
the constitutionality of the ordinance itself. Id. at 896.
96

Id. at 888.

97 Kreisner, 988 F.2d at 889. The court noted that in the most recent Supreme
Court case, Lee v. Weisman, the majority declined to reconsider the Lemon test. Id.
Therefore, the court saw "no justification for the... articulation of a new Establishment Clause test." Id.
98 Id. at 892.
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icy. Our observer realizes that the99Park... host[s] an eclectic
range of uses throughout the year.
In essence, the court reasoned that as Balboa Park was a
traditional public forum, a reasonable observer would view a city
permit for a religious display as an act of "tolerance of religious
speech,"1 0 0 whereas a denial would "demonstrate hostility to religion rather than the neutrality contemplated by the Establishment Clause."1 0 '
A similar result was reached in GrandRapids, 0 2 in which a
group of citizens challenged the city's policy of allowing a private
Jewish organization, Chabad House, to display a menorah in a
public plaza 0 3 during the holiday season. 10 4 The Sixth Circuit
the menorah did not vioheld that the use of the plaza to0 display
5
late the Establishment Clause.1
The court's holding rested on two pivotal factors: (1) the menorah was owned and sponsored by a private organization, and
therefore constituted private speech, 10 6 and (2) the menorah stood
in a traditional public forum.10 7 Furthermore, in applying the
reasonable observer standard, the court did not question whether
any person might find that the city endorsed Judaism, but rather
whether "the reasonable observer would conclude that the city en99 Id. (citing Wallace, 472 U.S. at 76, 83 (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
100 Id. at 894.
101 Id.
102 980 F.2d 1538 (6th Cir. 1992) (en banc).
103 Id. at 1540. The plaza housed the county building and city hall, and faced the
courthouse and police station. Id.
104 Id. at 1541. Individual citizens along with an organization, Americans United
for Separation of Church and State, brought suit in 1990 to enjoin the city from issuing a permit to Chabad House to erect its menorah. Id.
105

Id. at 1539.

106 Id. at 1542. Because Chabad House, not the government, was the individual

"speaking" through its display, it was protected under the guaranty of free speech. Id.
As the court noted, only the government and not a private individual can establish a
religion in violation of the Constitution. Id. at 1543. In addition, the court reasoned
that "Chabad House's decision to engage in religiousspeech does not inherently limit
its freedom; religious speech and association receive the full protection of the first
amendment." Id. at 1542.
107 Grand Rapids, 980 F.2d at 1541. According to the court, traditional public
fora "'have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of
mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between
citizens, and discussing public questions.'" Id. (quoting Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496,
515 (1939)). It was agreed by both parties that the plaza was a traditional public
forum as it had been used for many activities in the past including a Right to Life
rally, a Hunger Walk, an Italian Festival, and an Arts Festival. Id. at 1540.
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dorse[d] the religion."'0 8 By refusing to define the reasonable observer as one "who knows nothing about the nature of the exhibit-he simply sees the religious object in a prominent public
place and ignorantly assumes that the government is endorsing
it,"10 9 the court denied the plaintiffs an "Ignoramus's Veto."" 0 Instead, the court noted that a reasonable observer would understand the distinction between government endorsement of speech
and government accommodation of speech."'
IV. THE

REASONABLE OBSERVER

All three circuit courts used somewhat different definitions of
the reasonable observer. The standard utilized in the Eleventh
Circuit requires nothing more of the reasonable observer than the
ability to view the display. 1 2 In sharp contrast, both the Ninth
and Sixth Circuits impute certain knowledge to the reasonable observer before analyzing the effects of the religious displays.,

3

It

is submitted that the Ninth and Sixth Circuits offer superior standards, although they do require further clarification.
Despite the two circuits' focus on the type of public forum at
issue, it is suggested that whether the religious display occurs in a
traditional or limited public forum should have little bearing on
whether the private religious speech is permitted in the public forum.

14

The Constitution promotes equal access of private reli-

108 Id. at 1544 (emphasis added).

[W]e do not ask whether there is any person who could find an endorsement
of religion, whether some people may be offended by the display, or whether
some reasonable person might think Grand Rapids endorses religion. Instead we ask whether the reasonable observer would conclude that Grand
Rapids endorses religion by allowing [the display].
Id.
109 Id. at 1553.

110 Id. "The Ignoramus' Veto lies in the hands of those determined to see an endorsement of religion, even though a reasonable person, and any minimally informed

person, knows that no endorsement is intended, or conveyed, by adherence to the
traditional public forum doctrine." Id. It would essentially give to those persons eager
to see endorsement of religion in every governmental act the power to censure speech
which would otherwise be permissible. See id.
111 Id. at 1554. Chabad House sought "nothing that this court would not readily
compel the city to grant to any secular group in similar circumstances." Id.
112 See supra notes 79-86 and accompanying text (providing explanation of standard employed).
113 See supra notes 96-101, 105-11 and accompanying text (detailing standard

and rationale behind circuit courts' determinations).
114 See Doe v. Small, 964 F.2d 611, 618 (7th Cir. 1992). "[T]he Supreme Court has
refused to find the Establishment Clause to be a sufficiently compelling interest to
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gious speech to the public forum in both of these situations. 115 It
is, therefore, further submitted that if the type of forum at issue is
inconsequential, the characteristics of the reasonable observer
will take on added significance. In fact, the perspective of the reasonable observer may become as crucial an issue in the Establish116
ment Clause cases as it has in other areas of the law.
But who is this observer? Many scholars suggest, as did Justice O'Connor in Lynch, that the observer should be viewed as a
nonadherent of a majority religion. 11 7 This theory has a number
of flaws: (1) not all nonadherents will agree as to what constitutes

exclude private religious speech even from a limited public forum created by the government." Id.; Lubavitch Chabad House, Inc. v. Chicago, 917 F.2d 341, 347 (7th Cir.
1990) ("First Amendment jurisprudence mandates that if the government opens a
public forum to allow some groups to erect communicative structures, it can not deny
equal access to others because of religious considerations.").
115 See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 276 (1981). "[Wie are unable to recognize the State's interest in [avoiding Establishment Clause violations] as sufficiently
'compelling' to justify content-based discrimination against... religious speech." Id.
However, the Court does recognize the state's right to impose "[r]easonable time,
place, and manner" and content-based regulations which are "narrowly drawn to effectuate a compelling state interest." Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators'
Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983). As one writer has stated:
While there is strong evidence of separationist sentiment among the framers, there is certainly no significant evidence that separationism was anything more than a means of achieving neutrality. There is nothing to indicate that government hostility to religion was considered desirable. Indeed,
the free exercise clause is clear evidence that such hostility was not even
considered permissible.
Beschle, supra note 65, at 178.
116 See Lewis & Vild, supra note 8, at 691. The standard of a reasonable observer
has been used in many different contexts in law; for example, in negligence cases,
"reasonableness describes a quality of expected behavior," id. at 692; in criminal law,
"reasonableness measures a quantity of evidence or behavior" id. and finally; in contract law, "[it is also used to embody an interpretive perspective." Id. at 691-92.
117 See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O'Connnor, J., concurring). In determining the
effects prong of the Lemon standard, Justice O'Connor focused on the message sent to
nonadherents of the religion in question. Id. Later, in County of Allegheny, O'Connor
referred to the nonadherent's view again. 492 U.S. at 625. O'Connor stated that
"[elndorsement sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full
members of the political community and an accompanying message to adherents that
they are insiders, favored members of the political community." Id.; see TRmE, supra
note 3, § 14-15, at 1293. Adopting the nonadherents view is appropriate in that "actions that reasonably offend nonadherents may seem so natural and proper to adherents as to blur into the background noise of society." Id.; Lewis & Vild, supra note 8,
at 693. 'To avoid impermissible effects, it is necessary to give minority views veto
power." Id. These scholars believe this approval would shift the emphasis from reasonableness to the genuineness of the perception of endorsement. Id.
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endorsement; 1 8 (2) few judges will have a nonadherent's view; 119
and (3) such a perspective will not necessarily serve the purpose of
perception of excluthe Establishment Clause, as a nonadherent's
20
sion may be completely irrational.
It is proposed that the reasonable observer should be defined
neither as an adherent nor a nonadherent, but rather, simply as
objective.' 2 ' Any other classification of the observer would prove
to be without substantive significance or value in removing bona
fide violations of the Establishment Clause. Placing objectivity as
the cornerstone of this inquiry would ensure that the ill effects of
either open favoritism or hostility of religion would be avoided.
Furthermore, objectivity should demand that the reasonable
observer be informed, as both the Kreisner and Grand Rapids
courts contemplated. The observer should be deemed to receive
the full message, since the effect of any message can change dras-

118 See Kenneth L. Karst, The First Amendment, the Politics of Religion, and the
Symbols of Government, 27 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rav. 503, 516-17 (1992). "There may
be no unitary outsider's perspective" on many subjects because religious outsiders
could hold "widely diverse views." Id.
119 See TRIBE, supra note 3, §§ 14-15. It is judges who "must recognize the range
of possible responses and cannot avoid selecting among them." Id.; Karst, supra note
118, at 516-17 (noting that, ultimately, judge's perception is of sole importance). "tIlt
requires considerable empathy on the part of judges, particularly those who themselves adhere to the majority religion." Id.; Titshaw, supra note 52, at 1119 ("[Jiudges
are often religious persons themselves. No degree of higher scrutiny can fully compensate for judges' inability to overcome totally their own religious traditions and prejudice in deciding establishment clause cases.").
120 See Kreisner, 988 F.2d at 899 (Kozinski, J., concurring). "The Establishment
Clause, as the name suggests, forbids only the establishment of religion, not the mere
appearance of doing so." Id.; see Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2681 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("I find
it a sufficient embarrassment that our own Establishment Clause jurisprudence regarding holiday displays... has come to 'require scrutiny more commonly associated
with interior decorators then with the judiciary.' But interior decorating is a rock
hard science compared to psychology practiced by amateurs." (quoting American Jewish Congress v. Chicago, 827 F.2d 120, 129 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J.,
dissenting))).
121 See Titshaw, supra note 52, at 1104. Justice O'Connor has recognized that
objectivity is a necessary perspective. Id. In Lynch, O'Connor asked what the "'objective' meaning of the Statement in the community was." Id. (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at
690) (O'Connor, J., concurring). However, the inherent fault in O'Connor's "member of
the community" standard is that it allows the community's majority religions to determine the standard. Id. at 1104 n.91. Some suggest that, instead, majority religions be
subject to stricter scrutiny. Id. at 1116-17. This higher standard for majority religions
raises equal protection concerns and appears to be an unconstitutional establishment
of minority religions. Id. at 1117.
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tically if it is altered or misunderstood. 12 2 Specifically, it is submitted that courts should attribute to the reasonable observer
knowledge of the forum and its previous accommodation of different types of speech, as well as the extent of practical government
involvement in the display or activity. 1 23 To do otherwise would
be to grant the power of veto to an "obtuse observer." The Ignoramus's Veto is an unrealistic legal fiction upon which important
is
constitutional doctrine should not rest.' 24 To grant such veto 125
akin to giving the heckler the power to silence political speech.
Yet another reason to impute knowledge to the observer is
that failure to do so would cause displays by mainstream religions
to be deemed violative of the Establishment Clause, whereas displays by more bizarre, cult-like, or lesser known religions could
withstand First Amendment scrutiny, since no reasonable observer would believe the government endorses them.126 In effect,
the Eleventh Circuit test, requiring little of the observer, imposes
a harsher standard on majority religions, thus27resurrecting both
Equal Protection and Free Exercise problems.
CONCLUSION

Since its inception, the Establishment Clause has been the
subject of much tortuous and conflicting analysis. This Note has
attempted to work within the current Supreme Court framework
to propose a clarification of the Lemon test. The suggested reasonable observer standard recognizes an equal access policy for all
122 See Doe v. Small, 964 F.2d 611, 629 (7th Cir. 1992) (Easterbrook, J., concurring) (commenting that religious speech should not be censored because passerby misinterprets its public function).
123 See Beschle, supra note 65, at 187-88. Some commentators presume that the
reasonable observer will have this underlying knowledge. Id. Deciding what is an endorsement should be done,
not on the bases of whether there is a 'primary effect' of aiding religion, but
rather whether the display or ceremony will be reasonably perceived as a
choice of values by government, an endorsement of the message of the symbol or ceremony. Thus, giving a privately sponsored creche.., access to a
public park [on nonpreferential basis] threatens liberal neutrality far less
than a city-sponsored display of the same type.
Id.
124 See Grand Rapids, 980 F.2d at 1553.
125 See Doe, 964 F.2d at 630. "An obtuse observer will not appreciate that the
Constitution requires the government to tolerate all kinds of speech in public places
and so will infer that the government endorses what it does not forbid." Id.
126 See Titshaw, supra note 52, at 1117-19.
127 Titshaw, supra note 52, at 1117-19.
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speech, thereby minimizing hostility towards religion while promoting consistency within the law. What could be more
reasonable?
Marla A DeGaetano

